The hidden value behind capital structure decisions by Silva, Carlos Afonso Bi França e
A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in 
Finance from the Faculdade de Economia da Universidade Nova de Lisboa. 
 
 
THE HIDDEN VALUE BEHIND CAPITAL STRUCTURE DECISIONS 
 
 




A Project carried out on the financial area, with the supervision of: 









I estimate the optimal capital structure for a growth company, for which market value is 
dictated by its highly volatile nature. I study the welfare impact of corporate taxes, 
analyzing their economic effect of inducing higher bankruptcy levels. Assuming that 
management always seeks to optimize the market value of company’s assets, I find a 
significant loss of value that varies negatively with volatility. Flow and stock insolvency are 
important for the maximization of capital structure, and I compare both, modeling the 
value of the company as an option on its revenues. These are not only highly significant for 
R&D and startup companies but also have significant welfare consequences. I compare the 
options of liquidation and re-financing and find a clearly important role of early liquidation 
for R&D frameworks. I complement the study with a comparative statics analysis 
estimating the impact of risk to the value of the firm and the optimal capital structure 
decision, for a cross-section of firms. The results present quantitative evidence that 
reinforce the literature of trade-off and capital structure applied to growth companies. 
 
Keywords: Capital Structure, Real Options, R&D valuation, Simulation. 
INTRODUCTION 
We know a lot about what conditions capital structure decisions, but not much about either 
how to estimate accurately the real value-maximizing level of debt for a specific firm, or 
how to estimate the impact of these decisions for the whole economy. While there is an 
extensive number of economically significant factors that affect capital structure decisions, 
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balancing tax advantages against bankruptcy costs is consensually accepted in the 
profession as a significant aspect to be taken into account. Decisions based upon this 
premise may nevertheless lead to a perverse social effect. Corporate taxes impose a 
distortion on economy by giving managers the incentive to choose higher leverage 
structures. I will show that as a direct consequence of this, the number of bankruptcies 
increase leading to a market inefficiency, as part of the firm’s value can be appropriated by 
neither government, nor debt/stock-holders and is therefore lost. This paper explores 
these two concepts. I propose a valuation framework1 for the estimation of optimal debt 
levels and use the results to deduce the impact of taxes on social welfare resulting from 
bankruptcy levels. 
The capital structure decision, key to every company, assumes a particularly interesting role 
for R&D or startup companies exhibiting high operational volatility. There is empirical 
evidence of R&D managerial preference for conservative levels of debt (Long and Malitz 
(1985), Long and Malitz (1983), Myers (1977), etc.). A proposed explanation2 for this 
conservativism is the presence of costs3 other than bankruptcy, varying positively with debt 
ratios, impacting such firms to a wider extent than they do for value stocks. Amongst other 
contributions that extend the bankruptcy costs, under-investment is of most importance to 
R&D (for instance Myers4 (1977)). Growth companies that by definition have their value 
linked to cash-flows deferred to the future are heavily dependent on ensuring the 
                                                 
1 I explore the extensive empirical research on capital structure in appendix I, and find that most tests focus 
on proving a relation between debt ratios and a multitude of factors (volatility, growth options, size, etc), but 
there are not as many contributions towards measuring these relationships.  
2 Other explanations include the need to control agency costs of debt, that can only be done through limiting 
debt outstanding, since the effectiveness of bond covenants is reduced if a firm’s value is strongly based on 
intangible growth options (Long and Malitz (1983)); (O’Brien (2003)) points out both the necessity to keep a 
steady flow of cash for R&D windows of opportunity and product market introduction (financial slack).  
3 The cost of under-investment is described for example in Myers (1977). 
4 Myers proposes a theory under which firms limit borrowing even in the same perfect and complete capital 
markets proposed by Modigliani and Miller. 
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availability of funds to carry-out their growth and investment options. Myers builds on this 
notion to include the cost of under-investment, for which management will rationally 
follow a different decision path than they would for an unlevered investment (or riskless 
debt) and will tend to pass up positive opportunities, investing only when the expected gain 
is higher than the promised payment to bond-holders. 
To fully capture the impact of these intrinsic R&D costs and the value of management 
decisions5 for highly volatile investments, different valuation techniques besides the 
traditional discounted cash-flow approach must be used. Traditional techniques value 
investments in one step accounting neither the importance of flexibility on investment 
decisions nor the possibility of risk changing over the course of the project. I believe that 
the study of R&D companies is pointless if such features are not captured6.  
I propose the use of a framework that allows the liquidation of the company based on its 
market value (stock distress), at each period, long before the project takes a negative turn 
with debt-holders taking possession of company’s assets (flow distress). I do this by 
modeling the firm’s value as an American call option on the firm’s revenue (that in turn 
follow a stochastic process with time-varying volatility).  
Research is vast in models for company valuation and capital structure (nevertheless, 
contributions to the latter, model mostly flow distress, choosing to invest until firm’s assets 
reach zero, regardless of its economic value). Previous studies in this area that have 
developed concepts relevant to this paper include Schwartz and Moon(2001) and Schwartz 
and Gorostiza (2000b) that take into account stock distress utilizing an option theory 
framework similar to the one I apply; Strebulaev (2007) estimates the optimal capital 
structure maximizing the value of the company at time zero, allowing for costly re-
                                                 
5 The option value and undervaluation of the DCF approach is extensively explained in Athanassakos (2007).  
6 Option theory addresses these issues with the viewpoint of stepped investment decisions, acknowledging 
that risk varies as a project evolves. 
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financing in liquidity stress which is also included in my contribution; Goldstein, Ju and 
Leland (2001) model the cash flows as a geometric Brownian motion and solve for the 
optimal coupon and bankruptcy level allowing for debt levels to change through time; Miao 
(2005) models the level of technology idiosyncratic shocks (innovation level) and chooses 
to invest while above a certain threshold7, but does so using an equilibrium model not 
suitable for an individual firm calculation and therefore difficult to apply in this case.  
I adapt the model derived by Schwartz and Moon (2000)8 in which risk takes the central 
role, adding capital structure features such as in Strebulaev (2007). Schwartz and Moon 
developed this model to value Internet companies and make sense of the irrational 
exuberance of stock prices9 prior to the dot.com crisis. They model stochastic revenues 
highlighting volatility in its several forms10 to a much larger extent than other authors, 
which is important if we expect the option value to hold a significant share of the firm’s 
value.  
There is a multitude of factors influencing capital structure decisions, but the most decisive 
can be classified into two main families11: the Trade-Off between taxes and several costs 
(bankruptcy, agency, under/over-investment, etc.) or the Information Asymmetry theories 
(market timing, pecking order and signaling). The Trade-Off concept is the basis of this 
paper as it not only has an important economic reasoning when applied to R&D valuation 
but is also easy to model in simulation. 
                                                 
7 He chose this setup up to capture the under-investment problem in Myers (1977). 
8 The original model is disregards capital structure; I introduce it and include the cost of re-financing under 
liquidity stress. 
9 A reference to Shiller’s book that forecasted the dot.com crash. A lot of literature was developed in the late 
90’s by researchers and practitioners making use of real options to explain the difference in valuation found 
by DCF approaches and observed market prices. 
10 They model high (stochastic) time-varying expected rates of growth and unanticipated time-varying shocks 
to the expected rate of growth. 
11 I propose my categorization in appendix I, where I modestly survey the capital structure literature, 
recognizing that a lot has been proposed since the last survey available (e.g. Market Timing theory, etc). 
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Based on the results of the simulation framework that models the company operations as 
an American real option on the revenues, with capital structure decisions, I will measure 
the perverse social welfare impact of taxes and perform a comparative statics analysis to 
capture the impact of risk to financing decisions for a cross-section of firms in order to 
demonstrate the impact of capital structure decisions both from the viewpoint of rational 
management and governmental taxation policy makers.    
The rest of the paper is organized as follows, section 2 presents details of the model, data, 
simulation methods and assumptions. Section 3 analyses the findings and valuation, using 
amazon.com to calibrate the model. Here are included sub-sections for flow and 
economical distress, comparative statics and welfare analysis. Section 4 analyses the results 
and summarizes the conclusions. Lastly the appendix reviews the capital structure 
literature, classifying the vast contributions (from 1958 to 2008) to capital structure 
including empirical evidences into a survey that I very modestly attempt at. 
THE MODEL 
To value a company that holds significant growth options, some stylized facts are of crucial 
importance. First, volatility is what drives value. Therefore, revenues are modeled using a 
geometric brownian motion but accounting not only the volatility in revenues but also 
making the drift stochastic (and time-varying) and bringing unanticipated changes of the 
drift into the equation12. Second, startup companies exhibit extremely high volatility and 
growth rates when they initiate operations, but converge after a period to average industry 
values. In the model, these processes are made mean-reverting to capture this feature. 
                                                 
12 In their original contribution, Schwartz and Moon find that the variable that most impacts firm value is in 
fact the time-varying volatility in the drift.  
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Lastly, the model is developed assuming a limited liability company and for simplicity, a 
time horizon after which the company terminates operations and distributes the remaining 
cash-flow to share-holders.  
To solve for the optimal capital structure I maximize the company value at time zero by 
simulation, for several debt levels13. According to the trade-off theory, the total value will 
be given by the sum of the equity-holder value, debt-holder value and taxes. 
                                              (1) 
While the total value will remain constant14, management will rationally choose to increase 
the share available to investors at the expense of taxes. Specifically, managers will choose to 
optimize the first two components on the right side of equation (1). 
The value of the equity is the present value15 of the assets ( ) remaining at the end of the 
firm’s life (time T). The dynamics of the assets evolve, by accumulating net income, as all 
earnings are retained in the company until the horizon to avoid complicating the model 
with a dividend policy.  
                                               (2) 
                                                    (3) 
The value of debt in time zero is the sum of the present value of all debt payments (DP). 
As DP is constant, the value depends only on the liquidation or bankruptcy of the 
company.   
                                         (4) 
                                                 
13 To find an accurate debt level I developed a maximization algorithm that iteratively decides for a direction 
of search and divides value-debt_level curve in half towards a neighbor known point.  
14 The value remains constant for the same amount of bankruptcies. Increasing debt levels will increase the 
number of bankruptcies and therefore will reduce the total value. 
15 The value is discounted under the risk neutral measure at a constant risk-free rate. 
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The present value of taxes (TX) is given by equation (5). T can be either the horizon or the 
period when bankruptcy (flow or stock) happen. 
                                     (5) 
The net income ( ) is calculated from equation (6)-(11), where DP is the debt payment 
and  the tax expense in period t. Taxes are only paid if the loss carry forward ( ) 
equals zero. Its dynamics are given by equation (8). 
                                        (6) 
                                        (7) 
    (8) 
 is the revenue at time t, COGS the cost of goods sold and SGA the selling, general and 
administrative expenses. COGS is proportional16 to the revenues and SGA has both a 
proportional part of variable costs and a fixed cost FC constant in time. These parameters 
were estimated in Schwartz and Moon (2000) and are shown in table 3 in the appendix. 
                                    (9) 
                                                (10) 
                                             (11) 
There are two sources of uncertainty in this model both incorporated in the revenues 
which follow the geometric Brownian motion of equation (12). 
                                    (12) 
The stochastic equation captures the high uncertainty of an R&D or startup company. 
Both the drift and the volatility are time-varying. The drift has been adjusted downwards 
                                                 
16 The constants  and  were estimated by regression in the original contribution. 
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with the market price of risk ( ) so that valuation in equations (2), (4) and (5) can be done 
using the risk-free rate using the adjusted expectation operator. 
The drift is given by equation (13). It is a mean reverting process, also risk adjusted by ( ), 
modeling an initial high expected rate of return that with time falls to a more conservative 
level. The unanticipated change in the growth rate of revenues is given deterministically by 
the zero-reverting equation (14). 
                            (13) 
                                            (14) 
The volatility in the revenues is given by the deterministic mean reverting equation (15). 
                                        (15) 
Both volatility parameters start high but volatility in revenues converges to a lower value 
while shocks to the rate of growth of revenues disappear as the company matures. 
Cash varies with each period’s net income17, until either it is exhausted and reaches zero or 
a decision of liquidation is made, based on the market value of the company. When assets 
are exhausted bankruptcy happens and is accounted to the calculation of default 
probability. At each period the value of future cash-flows is forecasted using the Longstaff 
and Schwartz18 (2001) method. Forecasting the market value models the management 
decision to liquidate or continue in operation. The case when the company continues to 
operate and cash is below zero, models a creditors protection in which the company can 
negotiate and eventually leave the troubled situation, evolving towards positive grounds. To 
avoid that the model allows the company to stay in operation despite very negative results, 
                                                 
17 To make share-holders indifferent to when they receive the company cash-flows and therefore avoid 
defining a dividend policy, assets compound each period at the risk-free rate. 
18 The decision of continuing or liquidating the company is made each period by comparing the current value 
of the company with the fitted value from a cross-sectional OLS, regressing next period’s value on the state 
variables of the model (current growth rate in revenues and the current revenues in levels and raised to the 
second and third power). 
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I introduce a parameter to emulate the increased difficulty in raising new financing 
(therefore forcing stock distress sooner than would otherwise occur).  
Some simplifications are obvious from the equations. First, the model has no investment 
decisions and no CAPEX. An investment policy would be interesting to add to the 
framework, especially accounting the role of innovation. Several studies that use Poisson 
draws to model the discovery of ideas would be easily adapted to bring more realism into 
the setup of real options (Schwartz and Gorostiza (2000a), Schwartz and Gorostiza 
(2000b), Schwartz (2004), etc.). 
Second, depreciation tax shield was not included in the model, even though it would also 
be easy to do. Depreciation would nevertheless complicate the analysis of the tax effects to 
debt level (contributions that could be used are Schwartz and Moon (2001)). 
Third, costs: variable costs are a constant percentage of revenues, imposing a deterministic 
effect in EBIT in each period. This feature does not account for a learning curve that is 
part of every company. More importantly, fixed costs stay constant throughout time, 
eventually leading to an underestimation of bankruptcies in the model. Catastrophic events 
are also important for the value of these companies (e.g. competition and technology 
shocks). There is a significant amount of contributions that make use of Poisson variables 
to include negative value-destroying jumps ((Pyndick (1993), etc.).  
Fourth, interactions with other companies would be interesting to model in order to 
capture a company much dependant on a single product, and thus largely impacted by 
competitor’s actions. A recent area, that mixes real options with game theory to value R&D 
companies has given interesting contributions for a case such as this one (e.g. Miltersen and 
Schwartz (2004)). 
Lastly, debt payments are kept constant throughout the lifetime of the firm. The most 
simple approach, while there are recent empirical contributions that point to time-varying 
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target debt ratios (Leary and Roberts (2005) and Hovakimian and Opler and Titman 
(2001)). 
The reason not to model all these features was the trade-off between realism and simplicity. 
While the inclusion of some of those would not be difficult to achieve, it would complicate 
the analysis and deviate the attention from the debt-equity choice focus. 
Data used to calibrate the model is reported in appendix III. All values, including some that 
are used to compare simulation results are based on published financial information from 
Bloomberg and amazon.com’s financial statements reported until the 3rd quarter of 1999 
(the same data utilized in the Schwartz and Moon (2000)). Amazon.com is an iconic 
example of the .com era. Heavily biased towards growth, amazon exhibits a p/e ratio of 78 
and is heavily dependent on its innovation capabilities (it invests 9.9% of its total sales in 
R&D expenditures). What may appear at first a simple business model is in fact a multi-
level e-commerce platform based on state-of-art patented algorithms for recommendation 
and customer tracking.   
RESULTS 
I. Basic Results 
The optimal estimated capital structure for amazon.com is reported in table 1 along with 
the corresponding debt-to-value and equity-to-value ratios. The model estimates 
significantly conservative levels of debt, in line with the empirical evidence for growth 
companies. (Myers (2001)) reports debt levels for different industries, examplifying the case 
of pharmaceutical companies typycally operating at negative debt ratios19, besides the 
                                                 
19 They hold cash and marketable securities on excess of their outstanding debt, being therefore net lenders. 
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overly quoted case of Microsoft. Notice that amazon exhibits a large default probability of 
35.7% (stock distress is 36.6%) after optimizing the debt level, from an already high 
starting all-equity probability of 30.5% (33.4% stock distress). It is not surprising that 




The value of amazon for each level of fixed debt payment is reported in figure 1. The 
optimal debt has an expected value of 0.216 billion US$ and implies fixed responsibilities 
of 6 million US$/quarter20. 
 
Figure 1: Optimal Debt Values. The debt payment levels that maximize debt, from the perspective of 
Debt plus Equity. 
 
 
                                                 
20 Amazon has at time zero revenues of 906 million US$ per quarter and variable costs that amount to 94% 
of sales, leaving a profit margin of 6%. 
Capital Structure Value (Bio US$) Percentage 
Equity 7.659 97.3% 
Debt 0.216 2.7% 
Debt plus Equity 7.875  
Total value (with taxes) 11.426  
Table 1: Optimal capital structure at time zero. 
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II. Flow Distress, Probability of bankruptcy 
Valuation under different capital structures has to account the increasing probability of 
default (either flow or stock) that offsets the increase in value by means of tax shield. As 
the probability of default increases, the expected cost of bankruptcy21 also increases thus 
reducing the overall expected value of the firm. This might prove unberable to most 
investors holding claims on the company cashflows. The bankruptcy distribution is 
reported in figure 2 for the unlevered and optimal structures of capital.  
For all simulated scenarios, default occurs in the first years of operation when the initial 
cash balances are exausted. Increasing debt levels shifts default towards the beginning of 
the operations at the same time as it increases overall probability. In the not reported cases 
of extremelly high debt, bankruptcy happens 100% of the times in the first period. If the 
company survives the first years of operation, bankruptcy probability falls to insignificant 
values (after year 10 is less than 3%). 
 
 
Figure 2: Bankruptcy Probability Distribution. 
 
This feature models the extremely high uncertainty of a venture such as amazon in its initial 
years, as it goes trhough an affirmation period. During this period its revenues are highly 
                                                 
21 The expected cost of bankruptcy is the direct and indirect costs weighted by the probability of default. 
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volatile and its fixed costs play a crucial role for its survival. After the first initial years, if 
cash balances are not exhausted by strongly negative results, the fixed costs that push 
bankruptcy scenarios in the first years will become less significant22. In the long run the rate 
of growth of sales will diminish, its volatility will tend to zero, as the company reaches 
maturity and solidifies its position in the market. 
Figure 3 depicts another perspective of the bankruptcy probability, reporting accumulated 
figures, where total results are easier to see. For the optimal scenario, default occurs 
35.74% of the times. 
Allowing the liquidation of the company before it falls in distress, even though augmenting 
the number of bankruptcies, significantly increases the value for equity-holders as they do 
not have to wait until cash is exhausted and debt-holders take posession of the company23. 
This model always forces optimal bankruptcies, therefore solving the Management 
Entrenchment problem24 that is found on numerous times in real cases. Management in 
this scenario always acts in the best interest of share-holders. 
If we allow in the model for the company to recover after failing to match payments 
(entering a flow distress situation), introducing increased costs of re-financing, we reach 
exactly the same conclusions. The value of this (waiting-for-a-recovery) option proved 
insignificant in simulation. R&D companies are strongly affected by timing: failing the 
window of opportunity to introduce a product in the market leads to severe loss of 
competitiveness25 and devalue of the growth opportunities. While forecasting earlier the 
                                                 
22 This is modeled by the drift in the geometric brownian motion, making sales grow in the long run. 
23 The value of the company is strongly dependant on the option value, which is to say that the value of 
ownership decision plays a significant role in the model.  
 
24 Debt is issued in its optimal level (maximizing value), disregarding other considerations. 
25 Not to mention the capacity to attract qualified labor force. The importance of human resources to 
Internet and software-based companies as a means to foster innovation and explore growth options is crucial. 
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lack of economic viability increases significanty the value of the firm, letting the venture 
continue, waiting for a recovery along the path is of much less interest for an R&D 
company. Having small cash balances and lacking sellable assets, it typically enters a stage 
in which death is innevitable. 
 
Figure 3: Bankruptcy Probability Distribution Accumulated. 
  
II. Welfare Analysis 
Debt tax shield introduces an incentive for management to rationally increase debt levels. 
This has the perverse effect of inducing a larger number of bankruptcies with consequent 
loss of value. This inefficiency is reported in figure 1, where the total value26 of amazon for 
its optimal estimated debt level is compared to its estimated value under a no-tax setup 
(thus with no incentive to have debt). The size of the charts captures the loss of value in 
the scenario of 0.35 tax rate (the rightmost plot). 
The estimated optimal value of the company would be 11.485 billion US$ for the no-tax 
scenario and 11.426 billion (less 59 million) induced by a higher level of bankruptcies, from 
33.4% (default probability) to 36.6% after debt-equity optimization. The introduction of 
taxes leads to a destruction of 0.51% of total company value. 
                                                 
26 Total value is the expected value of equity, debt and taxes. While debt plus equity increases by means of tax 







Figure 4: Optimal Capture Structure from the point of view of  management, destroys value by 
inducing a higher number of bankruptcies. 
 
Even for this conservative estimate of capital structure there is a significant effect of the 
tax shield when looking from the perspective of the overall value for society. There is a 
non negligible social loss to be considered by taxation policy makers. This value would 
even be more extreme for companies exhibiting state variables less extreme as those of 
amazon. For a company that started operations with less significant probability of default, 
the effect of optimizing its capital structure by means of tax shield, would lead to a higher 









Figure 6 reports the comparative statics effect of tax shocks to the total value of amazon 
and for its bankruptcy probability. 
  
  
Figure 6: The effect of taxes for total value and default probability. 
 
The right chart reports the value under each tax rate as a percentage of the value under the 
no-tax scenario. There is a loss of 0.51% for the normal US tax rate and 0.67% when taxes 
increase by 5%. In extreme (unreported) scenarios the drop becomes steeper and 
eventually taxes alone become unbearable for a company to operate. 
In the leftmost chart, bankruptcy levels increase positively and significantly with taxes, 
explaining the loss of total value in the first chart. 
 
III Comparative Statics 
I analyze the effect of shocks in the parameters of the model, reporting the ones that 
proved to be more significant in the simulation (variable costs and volatility). Their effect 
on value (debt and equity), probability of bankruptcy and change in the optimal debt-to-
value ratio is discussed below. 
 
Variable cost parameters 
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The first and most obvious parameters that significantly influence the company are variable 
costs. As the OLS-estimated variable costs (  and ) are assumed to remain constant 
throughout the lifetime of the company, they have a stronger importance than their fixed 
counterpart, as the latter while having the power of bankrupting the company in the first 
years, soon becomes less relevant27. As would be expected, even a conservative change of 
1% upwards or downwards, exerts a significant effect on the three analyzed aspects. 
Optimizing the capital structure of the company for the new cost figures, the overall value 
moves from 7.875 billion US$ to [6.364; 9.177]. Overall this represents a variation of -19% 
in value when costs increase and 16% when costs drop. Debt-to-value varies between [2%; 
4%], increasing the debt capacity of the company when costs drop. Bankruptcy also varies 
positively with costs from 37% to [33%, 44%]. 
  
  
Figure 7: Comparative Statics, change in volatility and variable cost parameters. 
 
                                                 
27 Since fixed costs do not increase in time, its effect after the initial years becomes much less important. 
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Valuing any company is an exercise in which costs have to be carefully estimated. It 
becomes apparent the role of management in driving costs down, trough a learning curve 
as it may be the difference between success and bankruptcy (notice the high variation in 
distress probability) as a 1% increase in costs lead to 19.5% increase in the probability of 
default. 
Volatility parameters 
I test the effect of change in both the volatility of revenues (from 0.1 to 0.05 and 0.15) and 
rate of growth of revenues (from 0.03 to 0.01 and 0.05). Their behavior is identical, but the 
change in the rate of growth is far more extreme. Value changes from 7.875 billion US$ to 
[7.813; 7.948] for the  parameter and [4.040; 24.146] for . The volatility in the rate of 
growth has the capacity of increasing value in 200% or decreasing it to 50% of its value. 
Debt ratios vary from 2,7% to [1%; 6%] ] for  and [2.6%; 3.3%] for . Bankruptcy 
varies from [35%; 40%] for  and [21%; 43%] for . 
There is an important difference between the behavior of the two parameters. Volatility in 
the revenue drives the value slightly down as it increases default in 3%, while the shock in 
the rate of growth has the opposite effect (it doubles value). This is a finding in line with 
the observation performed in Schwart and Moon (2000). While volatility in revenues drives 
bankruptcy and therefore predicts lower debt-ratios28, less volatility lead to stable revenues 
allowing for a higher debt capacity. 
Volatility in the rate of growth has the opposite effect. It allows for extremely high (or low) 
rates of growth and therefore it captures the value of the option (as positive paths lead to 
large cash-flows and negative paths are liquidated early in the simulation). These are the 
                                                 
28 Bradley and Jarrell and Kim (1984) present empirical evidence of negative correlation between debt level 
and volatility of earnings. 
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scenarios where the option exerts its value, and what would be expected from the intuition 
of real options: the more volatility amazon has, the more valuable it will be. Volatility 
parameters evolve according to:  increases, so does distress, but value and D/V decrease; 
 increases, so does distress and value, but D/V decreases. 
 
 D U N 
σ 3,3% 2,6% 2,7% 
η 5,5% 0,8%  
Cost 4,9% 2,0%  
    
 
Table 2: Optimal Debt ratios for the perturbed parameters (U: upward change; D: downward 
change). 
 
Welfare values can be directly inferred from the estimated bankruptcy values. For the 
perturbed parameters, the value lost varies significantly solely for the shock on the volatility 
in the rate of growth of revenues. In this case the loss varies between [0.18%; 1%]. Being 
that the highest loss (1%) happens when  drops in value. A conclusion can be drawn, 
that the less volatile a company is (and the less valuable is the option) the higher will the 
social loss be. This is explained by the bankruptcy values. For the increase in volatility there 
is a probability of default of 43% for the optimized case compared to 40% for the no-tax. 
In negative shock, the values are 21% compared to 17%. As the value for the no-tax 
incorporates a very extreme probability driven by the high volatility values (not the debt 
level), the change introduced by taxation is less extreme. When volatility is high, the effect 
of taxes therefore is less extreme, as bankruptcies are already at a high level. Therefore the 
loss of welfare is higher for more stable industries, for which debt capacity is higher and 




The analysis of a growth company under a target static debt ratio, modeling the trade-off 
between taxes and bankruptcy leads to important conclusions, for investors doing R&D 
valuation, managers and governmental policy makers. 
Social welfare is significantly affected by the way taxes are constructed. There is a 
significant loss of 0.5% of company value, which is predicted to be more extreme for less 
volatile cases (comparative statics proves that conclusion, estimating a 1% loss). Not always 
what is best for managers (and share-holders) is optimal for society. 
There are also important conclusions to be drawn for R&D valuation, managers and 
investors. Estimating correctly (and managing) variable costs, together with the volatility in 
the expected rate of growth are the single most important factors for valuation. They exert 
a significant effect on bankruptcy levels and therefore have a strong relevance for the 
optimal structures of capital. Being able to forecast earlier the lack of economic viability 
increases significanty the value of the firm. Letting the venture continue, waiting for a 
recovery along the path is of much less interest for an R&D company. These findings 
pinpoint the role of management for the value of R&D ventures. 
Lastly, I find clear evidence of the trade-off in the framework under analysis. This theory 
has been criticized as bankruptcy costs do not seem to explain why debt levels are observed 
at levels lower than would be expected. One has to take into account not only the cost of 
bankruptcy, but also its probability. Considering a high probability of default, the trade-off 
is observable, and it in fact predicts a very small debt capacity. These results reinforce the 
literature on capital structure for growth companies. Debt capacity is strongly dependant 
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SURVEY OF THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE LITERATURE 
Myers (1984) inspired by a prior research note29 sums up the capital structure problem as 
“How do firms choose their capital structures? We don’t know”. Later, Myers (2001) 
summarizes the state of current knowledge “There is no universal theory of the debt-equity 
choice, and no reason to expect one”. In fact, while apparently disappointing, this reveals 
the level to which this field has matured. We have obtained sufficient knowledge to 
understand and thrive in the absence of a single all-encompassing structure of strategic 
decision-making that fits every case, market, Industry and reality. We also managed to intuit 
the economic factors that influence capital structure decisions. We may have not reached a 
conclusion for a definitive financing strategy (e.g. the optimality of a target debt level) but 
we do have a sizable knowledge about financing tactics (e.g. how to decrease agency costs 
or increase tax shields). Moreover the most relevant theories coexist well, they do not 
contradict each other but rather focus on different non-exclusive factors, that can be 
applied in different scenarios. Thus all of these theories, in their own way, can be used to 
shed light on particular aspects of financing decisions and serve a financial manager in 
diverse situations. 
I propose below one categorization of capital structure theories, surveying the most 
relevant literature. There are many surveys of capital structure but they all begin with 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) as I do.  
                                                 
29 Fischer Black in (1976) “The Dividend Puzzle”. Journal of Portfolio Management. 
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Modern theories of capital structure begin with Modigliani and Miller (1958) defining under 
which conditions30 the choice of financing is irrelevant to the value of the firm31. Their first 
two propositions32 of capital structure irrelevance were later enriched via a communication 
(Modigliani and Miller (1963)), correcting their conclusions in the presence of taxes, which 
they recognized as being wrong in their first work. Their overall contribution was extended 
with the introduction of offsetting costs, to avoid financing scenarios solely based on debt. 
This static trade-off theory anticipates the optimality of an equilibrium debt level between 
tax shields and costs arising from holding debt, which is to this day one of the most 
important capital structure models. Their fundamental and main conclusion that total 
company value33 does not vary regardless of the division of capital, is today undeniable.  
There are, however, different theories that emphasize aspects other than taxes as the key to 
optimizing capital structure and to some extent researchers have been adjusting Modigliani 
and Miller’s assumptions to match their hypothesis with empirical observations. It has been 
realized that besides bankruptcy, additional costs have to be factored in. An example of a 
factor that has been proposed, is agency costs, first34 introduced by Jensen and Meckling 
                                                 
30 Perfect capital markets (with perfect competition and full access to all players), similar conditions of debt 
for firms and individuals and full symmetric information. 
31 The aim of their paper was to lay the foundations of a theory of valuation of firms under uncertainty, to 
which the cost of capital is key.  
32 Modigliani and Miller (without taxes) Proposition I argues that any advantage of leverage can be achieved 
through homemade leverage and thus there is no added value by the firm. The resulting conclusion is that the 
weighted average cost of capital should remain constant. They prove empirically this result by regressing cost 
of capital on debt/equity for oil and electric companies and finding no economically significant coefficients. 
Proposition II explains the first by saying that the cost equity increases with debt making rwacc constant. There 
is no possibility of decreasing the cost of capital by accepting less-expensive debt. A third proposition 
reminded the separation from the financing instrument and the decision if a project is worthwhile. 
33 Total value remains the same, but most importantly the value of equity on which managers focus is 
increased by capital structure decisions. 
34 They first define the concept of Agency Costs, building on existing ideas traced back to Adam Smith (1776) 
“The director of such [joint-stock] companies, […] being the managers of other people’s money […] like the 
stewards of a rich man, they are apt to consider attention to small matters as not for their master’s honour”. 
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(76). Jensen and Meckling developed a theory of the ownership structure of firms proving 
that agency costs result from the differing agendas of corporate agents (managers, share-
holders and debt-holders), and lead to loss of efficiency as the firm bears all operational 
costs but is unable to capture its total gains.  
A significant effort has been devoted to explaining the source of these costs and 
consequent mitigation strategies. One can differentiate between two major lines, the 
conflicts between share-holders/managers i.e. agency cost of equity (Jensen (86), 
Williamson (88), Stulz (88), etc.) and share-holders/debt-holders i.e. agency costs of debt 
(Diamond (1989), Ross, Westerfield and Jaffe (2003), etc).  
Examples of the effect of agency costs of equity35 include the positive relationship between 
the amount of equity owned by management and either the amount of effort they are likely 
to put in or their propensity towards self-indulgent expenses (Jensen and Meckling (1976); 
over-investment, the role of free cash-flow and the use of debt to reduce cash-flows36 
(Jensen (1986)); over-investment by managers driven by selfish aspirations towards 
business growth to the possible detriment of profitability37 (Ross, Westerfield and Jaffe 
(2003)); voting rights of equity and anti-takeover measures38 (Stulz (1988)); unwillingness of 
incumbent managers to liquidate companies and the role of debt in imposing scenarios in 
which liquidation is optimal (Harris and Raviv (1990)); (Decamps et al (2006)) follow a free 
cash-flow explanation using a stylized model to explain how market imperfections lead to 
                                                 
35 And consequent mitigation strategies based on capital structure choices. 
36 For example through a leveraged stock repurchase, in the same way as dividends are used to reduce free 
cash-flow. 
37 As a familiar over-investment example, one can observe management’s tendency to diversify towards 
unfamiliar areas - acquisition or endogenously - when facing few growth opportunities and significant cash. 
38 Stulz finds that managers are likely to use lower debt levels as a protection against takeovers. Convertible 
bonds as a mean to dilute equity and protect against takeovers are an example of poison pills.  
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not an optimal target debt level but rather an optimal target cash level that a firm is 
compelled to follow. One can draw two main conclusions from these theories. First, all 
these aforementioned costs are mitigated by increasing debt and thus reducing free cash to 
an optimal (Decamps et al (2006) even focus on the cash itself as the target level followed). 
Second, there is a distinction between value and growth companies, the latter having a 
wider amount of growth options and thus more free cash necessity typically having less 
debt while the former has limited growth potential. 
Share-holder/debt-holder conflicts arise from the natural imbalance of equity-debt39 
payoffs  due to seniority characteristics of these types of securities, and examples include 
investment in value-decreasing high-risk projects (Diamond (1989)); less than optimal 
equity due to under-investment and reduction of equity through dividends (Ross, 
Westerfield and Jaffe (2003)). Observation estimates the direct costs (legal, administrative, 
etc.) in the magnitude of 1%-5% of market value (Warner (1977), Weiss(1990)), but 
indirect costs reach higher values of 10%-23% (Andrade and Kaplan (1998)). If one 
believes that highly leveraged companies are more likely to forego valuable investments and 
eventually have to cut-back R&D costs, training, etc. then it is obvious that growth 
companies are less likely to have large debt levels due to their under-investment costs being 
higher (Myers (1977)). Myers points out how growth companies in distress are more likely 
to see difficulties in raising capital to call debt.  
While the static trade-off theory elevates taxes and these theories emphasize agency costs 
and free-cash, still other theories focus on inside information. Given the characteristics of 
insiders (wielding better estimates of future cash flows), both asymmetric information and 
                                                 
39 Positive results (negative) lead to high gains (losses) for equity-holders and fixed gains for debt-holders.  
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the signaling effect of capital structure decisions stand out as important explanations for 
financing decisions. Asymmetric information has been used in several forms to explain 
capital structure. (Ross (1977)) is one of the first to propose an explanation based on 
asymmetric information, in which investors take large amounts of debt as a signal of higher 
firm quality40; (Leland and Pyle (1977)) propose an explanation based on management 
being risk-averse, in which increasing debt allows managers to retain a larger part of equity 
and thus of risk, reducing their welfare (since managers of good firms suffer a smaller 
decrease of their welfare, again debt will signal quality); (Myers and Majluf (1984)) and 
(Myers (1984)) propose an additional explanation based on asymmetry of information for 
the largely studied theory that firms choose their financing sources in a specific order of 
risk. They justify the ordering of financing sources (internal sources first41, debt second, 
and finally equity) with the fact that investors see issuance of securities as a signal of a 
company’s value, thus forcing managers to always issue first the securities that change value 
the least upon information disclosure. Managers are forced by the market to follow a 
pecking order and will only issue equity when the level of debt is unbearable. 
The Pecking Order, still today a very influential theory, predicts that growth companies will 
exhibit large amounts of debt (as their cash balances are typical low and they only raise 
capital after exhausting debt capacity), a clear contradiction to the aforementioned theories, 
based on agency costs or taxes (and in contradiction with observed data). Value companies 
                                                 
40 The reasoning is that if managers have their welfare linked to the success of the company, being penalized 
in the event of a bankruptcy, since lower quality firms have larger bankruptcy costs, higher quality companies 
tend to exhibit higher debt, with consequent signaling effect for investors.   
41 The idea of prioritization can be tracked to several older contributions. Prior explanations (Donaldson 
(1961), etc.) saw the prioritization of internal funds as a way to avoid issuing costs (not information 
asymmetry as Majluf and Myers propose). 
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on their turn, having large amount of cash would tend to have no debt, as they would use 
the cash to buy back debt. 
All of these theories stem from the same cause: information. They nevertheless differ in 
focus. The Pecking Order fully explains capital structure decisions with the maximization 
of company value by always seeking the least expensive instrument to finance growth 
options. Ross’s Signaling theory, though similar, does not center around low-cost financing 
but rather as a way to signal quality and management confidence in the firm’s projects. 
Lastly, the quite recent and influential Market Timing theory (Baker and Wurgler (2002) 
and Alti (2006)42) also focus on information asymmetry but explains capital structure as the 
cumulative result of management attempts to time the market. The result is different from 
the Pecking Order (that predicts a clear order of financing) as market timing predicts that 
low-leveraged firms are the ones that raised capital when their market valuation was high 
while highly-leveraged did the same when their valuation was low (there is no rigid order). 
Welch (Welch (2004)) in an important contribution, reinforces this idea showing 
empirically that stock returns have a large explanatory power over debt ratios. 
While theories of capital structure based on taxes, costs or information asymmetry are the 
most influential, other theories have arisen.  The Management Entrenchment hypothesis 
(Berger, Ofek, Yermack (1997), Garvey, Hanka (1999), Zwiebel (1996), Lundstrum(2008), 
etc.) proposes that capital structure is influenced by management willingness to prevent 
takeovers (for some a way to perpetuate ineffective management, reducing company value); 
characteristic of products and competition particular to a firm (Maksimovic (1986) and 
Brander and Lewis (1986)) are also pointed out as key to the debt-equity choice, also 
                                                 
42 Alti’s focus is not on defining the theory but instead an attempt to empirically estimate market timing 
impacts on capital structure around IPOs and economical conditions around IPO times. 
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(Maksimovic and Titman (1989)) explain the different debt structures over a cross-section 
of firms of different industries with the characteristic of a firm’s products, suggesting that if 
firms can change the quality of their products in a way unperceivable by customers (prior 
to acquisition) then this leads to higher leveraged structures of capital43.  
Summing up, the capital structure research can be a confusing area, if one considers the 
amount of coexisting theories. Nevertheless, an important fact is that in most cases these 
theories are not mutually exclusive or contradictory44: e.g. while trade-off proposes that too 
little debt does not optimize taxes and too much debt destroys value, cost-based theories 
(e.g. Free Cash-Flow) suggest that too little debt leads to under-investment and excessive 
indulging costs, which reinforces the virtue of debt. The same balance between debt and 
equity would be predicted by following any of these two theories. 
One of the appointed difficulties in electing one theory45 is directly linked to the empirical 
research that has been published. While there is good support for most of these 
hypotheses, it has proven to be difficult to test one model against the other (thus deciding 
on the validity of a specific one), due to the fact that being non-mutually exclusive there is 
a strong correlation between variables that can proxy for each case and statistically 
significant coefficients are difficult to interpret as in favor of one single theory. Overall, 
empirical tests aimed at pointing out the definitive capital structure explanation have so far 
proven to be powerless. Some examples help clarify the link between theories: Trade-Off 
                                                 
43 Building on the notion that a firm has an advantage when producing high-quality goods due to the 
reputation they create (market differentiation), they show that as debt increases the probability of bankruptcy, 
and thus threatens the firm’s reputation, then debt is negatively related to the incentive to increase quality. 
44 With the exception of some interpretations of the Pecking Order, that leads to rather different conclusions, 
as already mentioned. 




theory despite its obvious appeal seems to fail in practice most of the times. Graham (2000) 
finds that in a large domestic sample the typical firm was so far from its optimality that by 
issuing more debt it could double their tax benefits. He points to Management 
Entrenchment as possible explanation. Some theories are even harder to test (e.g. testing 
the signaling effect of issuing debt is certainly not an easy task). 
Empirical research aimed at quantifying the capital structure problem is also not abundant 
(one exception is the quantification of bankruptcy costs that has seen a number of 
contributions (Opler and Titman (1984), Andrade and Kaplan (1998), etc)). We do know 
for instance that companies should increase their tax shields, but by how much we cannot 
say. Still today the quantitative nature of the puzzle remains to be solved. 
Empirical research proving the relation between leverage and specific factors has seen 
extensive and important contributions. 
Cross-sectional studies prove the relationship between leverage and Market-to-Book ratio, 
that stands out as one of the most significant factor and one of the best predictors for 
leverage (with a strong negative relation). The main explanation is that growth firms are 
likely to keep a financial slack to ensure future capacity to invest and not miss important 
windows of opportunity (Smith and Watts (1992), Long and Malitz (1985)). Long and 
Malitz find the most highly leverage companies to be the most mature and capital-intensive 
firms while the less leveraged are the ones that exhibit high R&D levels or other proxies 
for growth opportunities (spending on advertising, book-to-market, etc). O’Brien (2003) 
goes one step further showing clear links between capital structure and being an industry 
innovator (measured as intensity of investment in R&D). He argues that low leverage helps 
to maintain competitiveness by ensuring availability of funds to continuous investments in 
R&D, launch new products and expansions through acquisitions He regresses leverage on 
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a set of independent variables such as relative R&D intensity, industry profitability, capital 
intensity, etc. and concludes that capital structure choice has clear impacts on strategy (thus 
not irrelevant).  
Other factors that serve as cross-sectional interpretations include the volatility of cash 
flows, as more volatile ventures have higher bankruptcy probability, and thus higher 
expected bankruptcy costs (Long and Malitz (1985), Titman and Wessels (1988), etc); the 
Size factor, as a larger company under distress will have less fixed costs of refinancing and 
more assets that it can sell (Titman and Wessels (1988)); Asset Tangibility, is positively 
related to debt, since tangible assets are more likely to preserve their value in face of default 
than non-tangible ones (Titman and Wessels (1988)). 
Time-series research focus on studying shocks that explain deviations from target 
structures. Important contributions have served as basis for the Market Timing theory 
(Baker and Wurgler (2002)) and Management Entrenchment (Friend and Lang (1988)).   
Empirical work has therefore pointed important links between factors, while still a lot has 
to be done to quantify them. Market Timing seems to be, from an empirical point of view, 
one of the most promising theories to this day (the future will tell its robustness). 
The overall puzzle is endowed with a stock of explanations, but still far from being solved. 
There may not be a single theory of capital structure as Myers points out, but rather 
practitioners must adapt the multitude of theories to every specific firm to find the 
optimally fitting solution. It might be that as the Trade-Off theory brings all existing costs 
together into a sliced pie, also as an analogy it may be that all existing theories contribute to 
the rational decision of financial managers and make sense only when combined. 





The equations used in the simulation are in their discrete forms, presented below. The 
discretization was done by direct integration of their continuous counterparts or by 
applying the Ito’s lemma. 
 
The revenues are given by 
                                 (16) 
 
The growth rate of revenues is given by 
            (17) 
 
Where 
                                    (18) 
 
And 







The parameter used to calibrate the model were estimated in the Schwartz and Moon 
(2000) model for amazon.com. 
 
Parameter Variable Estimated value 
Initial assets  0.906 
Initial revenue  0.356 bio/quarter 
Initial loss carry forward  0.559 bio/quarter 
Initial expected rate of growth in revenues  0.11/quarter 
Initial volatility of revenues  0.10/quarter 
Initial volatility in the expected rate of growth in revenues  0.03/quarter 
Industry rate of growth in revenues  0.015/quarter 
Industry volatility  0.05/quarter 
Corporate tax rate  0.35 
Risk-free constant rate 
 
0.05/year 
Cost of financing in liquidity stress  0.05/quarter 
Speed of adjustment for the rate of growth  0.07/quarter 
Speed of adjustment for the volatility of revenues  0.07/quarter 
Speed of adjustment for the volatility of the rate of growth  0.07/quarter 
COGS variable cost  0.75 
SGA variable cost  0.19 
Fixed costs  0.075 bio/quarter 
Market price of risk for the revenues  0.01/quarter 
Market price of risk for the expected rate of growth in revenues  0.0/quarter 
Horizon  25 years 
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Time increment  1 quarter 
Table 3: Parameters used in the simulation. These values were estimated from public data available 
at late 1999, from amazon published results and analyst reports. Detail on estimation is available in 
Schartz and Moon (2000). 
